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 Modern technology has had a major impact on today’s world. Machines have entered every sphere of human life and their further proliferation, as well as development, is almost certain. Owing to advanced technology, a variety of devices are equipped with 
Artificial Intelligence which makes them capable of performing complicated analytical 
tasks. However, in response to the futuristic market demand for a humanoid friend, 
the focus is now placed on creating machines whose artificial intelligence can mimic the natural intelligence of a human in, e.g. social, emotional and cognitive aspects. The 
development of humanized AI will narrow the gap between robots and humans. What is 
agreed upon by the majority of researchers and scholars is that increasingly sophisticated 
robots will resemble human beings to a great extent. Hence, the existence of a new entity 
in society confusingly similar to, or even better than, a human might raise the question 
about the legal recognition of robots. Furthermore, taking into consideration technological 
and social changes, a robot may one day be recognised as a moral subject – an entity that 
can have rights (privileges, claims, powers, immunities). Whether this would be morally, 
ethically and legally justified remains an unanswered question. An in-depth analysis of 
this dilemma is made by David J. Gunkel in his latest work, Robot Rights.  
 The book constitutes a detailed review of existing works on the topic of robot 
rights. Divided into six chapters, Robot Rights offers an objective investigation into the 
subject matter, presenting different critical approaches, ideas, assertions and arguments. 
The first chapter entitled “Thinking the Unthinkable” defines and explains basic concepts 
and theories that the author refers to in the following parts of the book. The middle four 
chapters focus on presenting and evaluating four possible arguments for and against 
integrating artificially-created entities into legal discourse which are based on two 
affirmative statements: “Robot can have rights”, “Robots should have rights” and their 
negations. The four modalities, which are also used as the titles of the chapters (1. Robots 
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Cannot Have Rights; Robots Should Not Have Rights; 2. Robots Can Have Rights; Robots 
Should Have Rights; 3. Although Robots Can Have Rights, Robots Should Not Have Rights; 
4. Even if Robots Cannot Have Rights, Robots Should Have Rights) are constructed around 
the philosophical distinction between “is” and “ought” developed by David Hume. The 
author does not advocate for any of the possibilities – the evaluation and judgement are 
left entirely to the reader. The last chapter, entitled “Thinking Otherwise”, presents an alternative approach which sets a direction for further considerations.
 Before entering the multi-dimensional discussion, different concepts connected 
with robot rights are discussed in Chapter One. First, it is essential to define what a robot 
is, thus the reader is introduced to a variety of definitions, from dictionary entries, through 
the definition by The International Organization for Standardization, to philosophers’ 
considerations. The undisputed influence on how robots have been defined, characterised 
and perceived in contemporary society has been exerted by science fiction books and films. 
Such a phenomenon has even earned the name of “science fiction prototyping” – the image 
of a robot and AI the general public share is formed by literature and cinematography. 
Furthermore, popular culture sets the direction for engineers and developers who want 
to meet the expectations of customers. An interesting point is made—that never before in 
the history of a humankind has a technology been depicted and described in such detail 
before commercial launching. 
 The book also provides the definition of the concept of rights, which is based 
on the Hohfeldian classification of incidents. The division is made into “first-order 
incidents”, which encompass privileges and claims, and “second–order incidents”, which 
include powers and immunities. Whether the rights can be granted to a given entity may 
be justified by applying the Will Theory or the Interest Theory. According to the former, 
the essential condition to become a right-holder is the ability to exercise a right, while according to the latter, it is to have an interest whose value can impose certain duties on others.
 In Chapter Two, robots are categorically denied any rights. It is stated that 
robots are nothing more than machines or tools, no matter how sophisticated they are. 
People should not feel obliged to them, as machines have not been created to participate 
in the search for the truth, justice or beauty – concepts whose position within moral 
considerations is indisputable. Instead, efficiency is the main attribute of robots. Created 
to maximise output and minimise input, technological instruments, whether they are 
simple like, e.g. a toaster, or complex, like, e.g. AI, are only a means to achieve goals set 
by humans. The only justification for respecting robot rights is to protect a robot as the 
valuable property of a person. In any different situation, even in the future when robots 
possess human-like traits, they should not be eligible for rights. What distinguishes a 
technological automat from a biological human being is that the former is the product of 
construction; the latter is the product of evolution. 
 An opposing viewpoint is presented in the following chapter which states that: 
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“Robots are able to have rights; therefore robots should have rights” (Gunkel 2018, 79). 
When elaborating the arguments behind such a statement, David J. Gunkel enumerates 
what features make an entity eligible for claiming rights – among them are sentience, 
reason, consciousness, autonomy, self-agency. Many scholars agree that in the future 
advanced technology will allow for the creation of artificially intelligent entities with 
capabilities sufficiently similar to those of human beings or even exceeding the functioning 
of the human brain. Although the opinions presented in this part of the book envisage 
integrating robots into legal systems, they also notice some difficulties in assessing legal 
eligibility. The questions raised concern the evaluation of the features described above, 
the difficulty in defining and elucidating them, as well as the detection of those features in 
robots. The last issue is connected with the relation between simulation and the simulated 
- if a machine can simulate consciousness is it conscious, or “is a simulated pain painful” 
(Gunkel 2018, 102)? The discussion proceeds towards philosophical questions such as, 
e.g. is it moral to create something that can suffer?
 The next two chapters refuse to advocate strongly for the necessity of granting or 
denying rights to robots. In Chapter Three, the scholars quoted recognise the possibility 
of creating robots eligible for rights, however, in order to protect humans’ well-being, 
the manufacture of robots equal to or greater than human beings should not occur. 
Robots ought to remain mere properties, instruments or tools that serve their creators. 
Furthermore, it would be better if designers avoid creating machines that resemble 
humans and trigger some kind of emotional involvement. Vulnerable customers need to be 
constantly reminded by the robot itself about its true nature – that it is nothing more than 
a machine. Much as it is logical to extend rights to non-human entities, e.g. corporations 
are considered by many national and international laws as legal persons with certain 
rights and responsibilities, according to Joanna J. Bryson “conferring legal personality 
on robots is morally unnecessary and legally troublesome” (Gunkel 2018, 111). Another 
interesting notion introduced in this chapter is the concept of robot slavery. Designed to 
perform dirty, monotonous and dangerous jobs for their “masters”, with no capacity to 
bear obligations and rights, robots fit into the position of a slave. However, taking into 
consideration the legal solutions applied in Roman, US or Jewish law, a slave can be held 
liable for wrongdoing, therefore it is subject to legal action. Yet, it is difficult to punish a machine when the punishment, such as termination, physical pain, imprisonment, does 
not affect it. Although the slave metaphor exists in the robot rights discourse, it only 
makes the situation more complicated.
 The final modality described in Chapter Four opts for an opinion that although it 
is unlikely, at least for now, to create such an advanced entity which will demand social 
standing, legislators should implement some level of recognition and protection of robots. 
Such regulations should encompass mostly social robots, as these are the robots with 
which people socialize and to which they attribute human characteristics. Integrating 
robots into legal systems can discourage humans from violent behaviour towards these 
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machines. The human tendency to anthropomorphic projection influences the way people 
perceive robots and, as a result, robots are regarded not as they are but as they appear to 
be. If a person perceives a robot as a social entity, making it suffer reflects badly on such 
a person. Also, brutal and violent behaviour towards robots can be projected onto other 
human beings or living creatures. Sabine Hauert summarises the discussion with these 
words, “so it is really about protecting the robots for the sake of the humans, not for the 
sake of the robots” (Gunkel 2018, 151).
 The last chapter, entitled “Thinking Otherwise”, presents a significantly different 
approach to the ones described in the preceding four chapters, offering the deconstruction 
of the conceptual configuration of the is/ought inference. The proposal relates to Emmanuel 
Levinas, who advocates for a stance that ethics should take precedence over ontology. In 
this way, morality is regarded “not as a branch of philosophy” but as the “first philosophy” 
(Gunkel 2018, 164). Levinas criticises Western ontology, which is based on reducing and mediating differences and heading towards the same, and instead, he proposes the 
“ethics of otherness”. According to this French philosopher, moral status should not be 
granted on the basis of previously identified shared characteristics but on the basis of 
the relation that one entity can forge with another. Any entity that allows for a face-to-
face encounter which interrupts self-involvement is considered as “Other” and is a part of 
ethics. The application of Levinas’s thought constitutes a useful tool in establishing a place 
for robots in the moral community. The terms that regulate the position of the subject and 
the object of rights could be assigned through the process of encounter which occurs 
between a person and a robot. Although Levinas never wrote about robots, technology 
or robotics, his considerations can be meaningful while analysing this issue. Yet, David J. 
Gunkel notices some difficulties connected with the application of Levinas’s philosophy 
to the study of robot rights. Firstly, the ethics described by the French philosopher are 
exclusive to human relations. Applying his thought to robots would require reading 
Levinas beyond the anthropocentric restrictions of the “Other” that is presupposed to be 
a human being. The attempts to recognize the “Other” as different from a human person 
focus on things that belong to the natural world and marginalize anything artificial like, 
e.g. robots. Secondly, going beyond the anthropocentric boundaries can be criticized as 
moral relativism. On the other hand, absolutism might be limiting in ethical thinking. In 
between comes the notion of “ethical pluralism” which juxtaposes the set norms with 
their possible applications and interpretations. In this way, broadening the boundaries is 
not considered as relativistic but as relational, as it allows different variables to be taken into consideration, including those connected with technological development.
 Robot Rights by David J. Gunkel is a book that gathers and comprehensively 
presents distinct opinions and arguments by various authors, scholars and researchers on 
the subject in question. The moral and legal standings of different kinds of robots – social, 
industrial, domestic – need to be defined and regulated in order to ensure successful and 
effective cooperation between artificial entities and humans. Modern technology has not 
The Status of Robots in Moral and Legal Systems
Review of David J. Gunkel (2018). Robot Rights. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press
31
allowed for the creation of a robot with human-like features yet; however, the development 
of robotics may suggest that one day those artificial entities will be equipped with or even 
exceed the capabilities of a human. To many people, the necessity of incorporating robots 
into ethical and legal discourse seems to be extremely futuristic, distant from everyday 
reality. However, the purpose of Robot Rights is to raise awareness that, regardless of 
one’s personal opinion on the subject, one needs to start “thinking the unthinkable”, and 
therefore the book provides its readers with the necessary tools to understand, develop 
arguments, and enter into the discussion on robot rights.
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Abstract: David J. Gunkel in his latest book Robot Rights presents the opportunities and challenges of integrating robots into moral and legal systems. The research question 
asked by the author is “Can and should robots have rights”? Following the Humean 
distinction between “is” and “ought”, Gunkel creates four statements that either opt for or 
against incorporating robots into legal discourse. The four modalities group contrasting 
opinions developed by different scholars on the subject of the eponymous robot rights. The author provides readers with yet another alternative approach to the question of 
legal recognition of robots which is based on Levinasian philosophy.
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